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The DACA Case: Agencies’ “Square
Corners” and Reliance Interests in
Immigration Law
Peter Margulies*

Stewardship has long been a trope in U.S. law and governance. The
Framers spoke of the “trust” that the people reposed in their government.1 In immigration cases, the Supreme Court has on occasion
curbed state enforcement, viewing states as too prone to “sudden irritation” to adequately steward abiding national interests.2 Holding in
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the Univ. of California that
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under President
Trump had failed to engage in “reasoned decisionmaking” when it
rescinded the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, the Court refined this stewardship paradigm.3
Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the Court in Regents, noted
that in announcing DACA, President Barack Obama’s then–DHS secretary, Janet Napolitano, had provided two things of value to foreign
nationals who came to the United States as children with no lawful
immigration status: (1) a reprieve from deportation, called “removal”
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); and (2) eligibility
for various benefits, including work permits.4 According to Roberts,
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law; B.A., Colgate University;
J.D., Columbia Law School.

1 See The Federalist No. 23 at 153–54 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961); Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed H. Shugerman, Faithful Execution and
Article II, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 2111, 2119 (2019) (discussing the Constitution’s Take Care
Clause as forging a system of laws as a trust that the president must protect).
2 See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012) (citing The Federalist No. 3
at 44 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (cited by Supreme Court in later edition)).
3

140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).

Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V.
Aguilar et al., Acting Comm’r, U.S. Cust. & Border Prot., et al. (June 15, 2012), https://
bit.ly/30wLkPh [hereinafter Napolitano Memorandum].
4

127

23205_06_Margulies.indd 127

9/7/20 11:45 AM

Cato Supreme Court Review
DHS had failed to consider whether DACA recipients’ participation in
employment, education, medical treatment, military service, or family life formed expectations—“reliance interests” in legal parlance—
that the agency had to accommodate. Moreover, DHS had failed to
consider alternatives to DACA’s total rescission, such as allowing a
longer wind-down of the program or keeping the reprieve from removal but ending eligibility for benefits.
The stewardship outlined in Roberts’s opinion is deliberative, not
substantive: it is about process, not outcomes. Roberts conceded that
DHS had the power to end DACA, which DHS, based on the conclusion
of Attorney General Jeff Sessions, had in September 2017 found to be
unlawful.5 DHS could have justified the rescission by stating in writing
that enforcing the INA outweighed recipients’ reliance interests. However, in ending the program, Roberts explained, an agency had to at
least address the interests of stakeholders as part of “the agency’s job”
and its “responsibility.”6 Roberts did not mention stewardship per se
in his opinion. Nevertheless, framing deliberation as a core component
of “responsibility” for a “job” casts DHS’s failure in stewardship terms.
A sound steward may safeguard a trust by choosing any one of several
paths. But stewardship cannot be random or heedless. It requires appropriate consideration of the risks and benefits of each choice.
The model of stewardship reflected in Roberts’s opinion in Regents
has two prongs. The first is consistency: a good steward will deliberate carefully before taking action and stick with the reasons that
drove her initial decision rather than dangle a string of shifting justifications before befuddled stakeholders. In addition, a good steward
will balance the equities of all parties and of the public.7
5 Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
James W. McCament et al., Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al.
(Sept. 5, 2017), https://bit.ly/2DJPcDy [hereinafter Duke Memorandum]; Letter from
Jefferson B. Sessions III, Att’y General of the United States, to Elaine Duke, Acting
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 4, 2017), https://bit.ly/3kl3zz1 [hereinafter
Sessions Letter].
6

140 S. Ct. at 1908–09.

See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426, 434 (2009) (noting that stay of removal pending appeal hinges not merely on merits of case, but also on hardship to the applicant,
the countervailing factor of hardship to other parties, and consideration of the public
interest); see also Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (noting factors for preliminary injunction); see generally Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law:
Presidential Stewardship, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers,
7
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To promote consistency in Regents, Roberts invoked an administrative law standby, the Chenery doctrine, which holds that an agency explaining a decision gets only one bite at the apple.8 Courts look at how
the agency explained its action when the action was taken, not how the
agency explains it later, once litigation about the action is underway.
Reading Chenery broadly, Roberts was able to force DHS off its most
favored turf. DHS had to stand or fall with Acting Secretary Duke’s
stark conclusion in 2017 that DACA was unlawful. Because of Roberts’s
broad reading of Chenery and its “one bite at the apple” rule, Roberts
simply refused to consider the more comprehensive 2018 justification by
Duke’s successor as acting secretary, Kirstjen Nielsen, that DACA was
flawed from both a legal and a policy perspective.9 But, as Justice Brett
Kavanaugh noted in his dissent, Roberts’s broad reading of Chenery may
be a stretch. The Chenery doctrine is most effective in stopping agency
lawyers in litigation who would otherwise invent new rationales from
scratch.10 Acting Secretary Nielsen’s 2018 justification came from a responsible agency official—one asked to create that filing by a district
judge, no less—not a desperate lawyer in the throes of litigation.
Complementing Justice Kavanaugh’s critique of the consistency
prong in Roberts’s opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that
Roberts’s stress on recipients’ reliance interests ignored the INA’s
structure. According to Justice Thomas, the INA is a “carefully crafted
scheme” that specifically enumerates classes of people entitled legally
to enter the country, including close relatives of citizens and current
lawful permanent residents (LPRs), skilled employees, and refugees,
94 B.U. L. Rev. 105 (2014) (discussing stewardship and discretion in immigration law
administration); Peter Margulies, Rescinding Inclusion in the Administrative State:
Adjudicating DACA, the Census, and the Military’s Transgender Policy, 71 Fla. L. Rev.
1429, 1467–74 (2019) (discussing DACA rescission).
8

140 S. Ct. at 1909 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943)).

Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.
(June 22, 2018), https://bit.ly/33vMMDC [hereinafter Nielsen Memorandum]. After
the Supreme Court’s decision in Regents, current DHS Acting Secretary Chad Wolf
rescinded both the Duke Memorandum and the Nielsen Memorandum, and informed
the public that he was considering rescinding the Napolitano Memorandum that had
announced DACA. Acting Secretary Wolf took a number of interim steps, including
barring new DACA applications. See Chad F. Wolf, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Reconsideration of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled “Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States
as Children” (July 28, 2020), https://bit.ly/3a3cG2P.
9

10

140 S. Ct. at 1934–35 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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as well as nonimmigrants such as students and tourists.11 Other foreign nationals seeking to enter or remain in the United States often
lack either a visa that confers a lawful status or any reasonable path
for gaining a lawful status. Taking the INA’s structure seriously, immigration officials should not second-guess Congress’s methodical
distinction between foreign nationals who can receive a lawful status
and those without a reasonable chance for that status. Nor should
immigration officials grant crucial components of lawful status, such
as a reprieve from removal or eligibility for a work permit, to a large
group of otherwise removable foreign nationals. As a “sweeping
nonenforcement program,” DACA undermined the INA’s structural
integrity, in much the same way as the Obama administration’s Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) program, which had
never gone into operation because courts had enjoined it as exceeding
the power that Congress had delegated to immigration officials.12
While the question is a close one, ultimately Chief Justice Roberts’s
vision of deliberative stewardship best fits history and practice regarding prospective Americans. Roberts’s emphasis on consistency
echoes his rejection in Department of Commerce v. New York of the
Commerce Department’s “pretextual” justification for adding a
citizenship question to the census.13 Moreover, Roberts’s analysis is compatible with Thomas’s structural approach. According to
Roberts, DHS could readily have reached its desired outcome of ending DACA. To do so, DHS merely had to expressly balance DACA
recipients’ reliance interests, the public interest, and enforcement of
the INA. Given the interests at stake, that balancing is a reasonable
expectation that leaves the INA’s structure intact.
This article, like Gaul, is divided into three parts. Part I provides
background on DACA and DAPA, including the courts’ reliance on a
structural argument in their rejection of DAPA, before discussing the
Trump administration’s effort to rescind DACA. Part II outlines the history of an alternative to the structural argument—a stewardship model
that this article traces back to the Founding era. Part III examines Chief
Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Regents in light of the stewardship
model and contrasts Roberts’s analysis with the insightful arguments
made in dissent by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh.
11

Id. at 1930 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

12
13

Id. at 1923–26, 1930.

139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
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I. President Obama’s Immigration Initiatives and President Trump’s
Response: DACA, DAPA, and the Structure of the INA
DACA was a presidential response to a legislative logjam. As a U.S.
senator, Barack Obama wrote about meeting a third-grade student,
Cristina, with an uncertain immigration status. That encounter, at which
Cristina asked for then-Senator Obama’s autograph, prompted Obama to
reflect that the most urgent risk was not being “overrun by those who do
not look like us,” but failing to “recognize the humanity of Cristina and
her family.”14 As president, Obama failed to persuade Congress to act on
this sentiment by passing the DREAM Act, which would have provided
legal immigration status to noncitizens who arrived in the United States
as children.15 Since the overwhelming majority of noncitizens in this category did not have a lawful immigration status, Congress’s failure to
act meant that noncitizens in this group faced removal. Pondering the
human predicament that Congress had not resolved, Obama took executive action through DHS. President Obama later announced a larger
immigration initiative: DAPA. Finally, in 2017, DHS under the Trump
administration announced that it was rescinding DACA.

A. DACA’s Criteria
Following President Obama’s lead, then–DHS Secretary Janet
Napolitano issued a memorandum announcing DACA on June 15, 2012.
DACA did not confer a lawful immigration status on the “Dreamers”
who were children when they entered the United States; only Congress
can establish specific categories that lead to lawful permanent resident
(LPR) status or various temporary nonimmigrant forms of status, such
as students, tourists, or temporary workers. Rather, DACA granted eligible foreign nationals a renewable reprieve from deportation (called
“removal” under current immigration laws) and permission to apply
for a work permit.16
14 Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American
Dream 318 (2006).

15 See Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong.
(2001) (as reintroduced 2011).

16 See Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 4. Compare Robert J. Delahunty & John
C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws,
the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 781, 856 (2013) (asserting that
DACA went beyond the scope of delegation), with Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Beyond Deportation: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Cases 54–59 (2015) (arguing that the ambit of discretion under INA included large-scale programs such as DACA).
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To be eligible, an applicant had to have come to the United States
before reaching the age of 16. In addition, to ensure that applicants
had sustained ties to this country, the applicant had to have resided continuously in the United States for at least five years before
June 15, 2012, and be a resident of the United States on that date.
Targeting DACA’s benefits to those who had pursued an education
or service, an applicant had to be currently enrolled in school, have
received a high school diploma or general education development
(GED) certificate, or be an honorably discharged veteran of the U.S.
Armed Forces. To winnow out foreign nationals who had engaged in
crime, Napolitano also ruled out any applicant who had a felony or
“significant misdemeanor” conviction on her record or multiple misdemeanor convictions, or in any other way might threaten national
security or public safety. Finally, to keep the program manageable
and focused on young people who had not yet had a chance to build
their lives, applicants could be no more than 30 years old.17

B. An Attempt to Build on DACA: DAPA’s Introduction and Chilly
Reception in the Courts
Following up on DACA and responding to continued inaction by
Congress, President Obama sought additional programs to aid undocumented foreign nationals. In November 2014, DHS Secretary Jeh
Johnson, Napolitano’s successor, announced the Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans (DAPA) program. DAPA extended DACA-style
treatment—a two-year renewable reprieve from removal and eligibility for a work permit—to a much larger group: parents of U.S. citizens.18
17 DHS also classified DACA recipients as “lawfully present” and thus eligible for
driver’s licenses.

18 See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
to León Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs, Thomas S. Winkowski,
Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, and R. Gil Kerlikowske,
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 3, 5 (Nov. 20, 2014); Memorandum from Karl R.
Thompson, Prip’l Dep’y Asst. Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns., The Department of
Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully
Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others (Nov. 19, 2014), https://
bit.ly/3gu7F5L [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum]. The Fifth Circuit ultimately
held that DAPA went beyond Congress’s delegation of power to the executive branch
under the INA. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 180 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an
equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); cf. Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality
of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 213, 284 (2015)
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The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) estimated
that over four million undocumented foreign nationals—roughly
40 percent of the United States’s undocumented population—would
be eligible. Although some DAPA-eligible persons had a theoretical
path to acquiring LPR status because their children were U.S. citizens,
in most cases that path would have been very difficult.19
In challenges to DAPA brought by states, including Texas, the
Fifth Circuit held that deferred action of DAPA’s size and scope conflicted with the INA’s framework.20 Its analysis applied most clearly
to DAPA’s grant of eligibility for work permits and other benefits.
While the government had some discretion in merely deciding not
to remove foreign nationals, its decision to grant the “benefits of lawful presence” to a large group of undocumented noncitizens clashed

(arguing that DAPA exceeded presidential power). The author of this article served as
cocounsel for amici curiae at all phases of the Texas litigation, including proceedings
before the Supreme Court, arguing that DAPA clashed with the structure and logic
of the INA. See Brief for Former Homeland Security, Justice, and State Department
Officials as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, United States v. Texas, 136 S.
Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674). In lower courts, the author served as cocounsel with Ilya
Shapiro of the Cato Institute and Josh Blackman of South Texas College of Law, along
with Leif Olson of the Olson Law Firm. Brief as Friends of the Court Supporting Plaintiffs of the Cato Institute and Law Professors, Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591
(S.D. Tex. 2015) (No. 14-254), https://bit.ly/3a1FRmG.
19 See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (requiring that a U.S. citizen be at least 21 years old
to sponsor a parent for an immigrant visa); see also Thompson Memorandum, supra
note 18, at 29 n.14 (conceding that many DAPA recipients would “need to leave the
country to obtain a visa at a U.S. consulate abroad”; because of some period of unlawful presence in the United States, a DAPA recipient would then “in most instances” be
subject to either a 3- or 10-year statutory bar on reentry into the United States, requiring her to wait outside the United States “for the duration of the bar”).

20 Texas, 809 F.3d at 180. For commentary on DAPA, compare Adam B. Cox & Cristina
M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 Yale L.J. 104, 144–51
(2015) (discussing rationale for DAPA based on consistency with the INA, while also
suggesting that a better rationale would look to Congress and the president as coprincipals in crafting immigration law), and Evan D. Bernick, Faithful Execution: Where
Administrative Law Meets the Constitution, 108 Geo. L.J. 1, 57–61 (2019) (suggesting
that the Take Care Clause provided authority for DAPA), with Peter Margulies, The
Boundaries of Executive Discretion: Deferred Action, Unlawful Presence, and Immigration Law, 64 Am. U. L. Rev. 1183, 1244–52 (2015) (arguing that DAPA exceeded
power Congress had delegated to the executive branch), and Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 671, 674–75 (2014) (asserting that the Constitution curbs president’s power to decline to enforce the law).
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with the INA.21 In an earlier decision denying a stay of the district
court’s preliminary injunction against DAPA’s operation, the Fifth
Circuit explained that the INA included precise categories of foreign
nationals allowed to enter or remain in the United States.22 According to the Fifth Circuit, Congress’s enumeration of “narrow classes”
of foreign nationals allowed to enter and remain and a large residual
group subject to removal served an important purpose in Congress’s
plan: it protected the jobs of U.S. citizen and LPR workers.23 The court
reasoned that, from Congress’s perspective, dramatically expanding
the pool of foreign nationals eligible for employment could cloud the
jobs outlook for citizens and LPRs.
To address this concern, the Fifth Circuit explained, Congress and
immigration officials had limited the scale and scope of deferred action. Grants of deferred action have typically served as “bridges” to
a lawful status or have entailed “country-specific” responses to war,
political turmoil, or natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes. Deferred action is also available in a small number of cases
involving hardships, such as extreme youth, sickness, or old age. In
light of the INA’s detailed framework, it was unlikely that Congress,
without saying so in the law, had also given immigration officials
sweeping power to grant deferred action to millions of otherwise removable noncitizens. As Justice Antonin Scalia said, Congress does
not “hide elephants in mouseholes.”24 Based on this analysis, the
Fifth Circuit found that DAPA exceeded executive power under the
immigration laws, and the Supreme Court affirmed that decision by
an equally divided 4-4 vote after Justice Scalia’s passing.

C. DACA’s Rescission under the Trump Administration
Although DAPA never went into effect, DACA was in full swing
through the remainder of the Obama administration and the first
months of the Trump presidency. In the summer of 2017, however,
21
22

Texas, 809 F.3d at 180 (noting tension with statutory scheme).
Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 759–61 (5th Cir. 2015).

Texas, 809 F.3d at 181 (remarking that “‘a primary purpose in restricting immigration is to preserve jobs’” for U.S. citizens) (citation omitted). But see Ilya Somin, Free to
Move: Foot Voting, Migration, and Political Freedom (2020) (arguing that immigration
enhances employment prospects for citizens and lawful residents).
23

24 Texas, 787 F.3d at 760 n.86 (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457,
468 (2001)).
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a number of states that had sued to stop DAPA, led by Texas, wrote
a letter to the Trump administration arguing that DACA was illegal
for the same structural reasons that the Fifth Circuit had cited in affirming the preliminary injunction against DAPA. The states threatened a lawsuit against DACA. In September 2017, Attorney General
Jeff Sessions wrote a letter asserting that DACA also lacked “proper
statutory authority” and thus was an “unconstitutional” exercise of
executive power, citing the Fifth Circuit’s DAPA decision.25 Acting
DHS Secretary Elaine Duke followed up with a memorandum that
announced DHS’s intention to rescind the program, referring to the
stark legal conclusion in Sessions’s letter and finding, without further explanation, that DACA was illegal.
Secretary Duke did not summarily revoke DACA’s terms for recipients. In a nod to the “complexities . . . [of] winding down the
program,” DHS agreed to process all initial applications then in the
pipeline and all renewal requests from recipients whose two-year
term would expire by March 5, 2018.26 Since Chief Justice Roberts
highlighted the choices that DHS’s wind-down entailed and the lack
of explanation for those choices, further detail is useful.
Under Duke’s rescission plan, DHS would not accept new DACA
applications after the issuance of her memorandum and the group
of some 700,000 DACA recipients would lose benefits on a staggered
basis, starting on March 6, 2018, with all benefits terminating by
March 6, 2020. As an illustration, consider a DACA recipient whose
two-year period of participation in the program was due to terminate on March 6, 2018. The recipient hoped to renew her participation
for an additional two-year period. Renewal was crucial, because the
recipient had started a four-year undergraduate college program in
September 2016, planning to major in computer science. If all went
according to plan, the recipient would graduate from college in May
2020. Duke’s wind-down would have changed those plans, because
it barred renewals for periods of participation that expired after
March 5, 2018. Under Duke’s wind-down, the recipient would lose
DACA almost two years into her undergraduate program, with slightly
over two years remaining before she was due to obtain her degree.
25 Sessions Letter, supra note 5. The Fifth Circuit did not discuss DAPA’s constitutionality, since the court held that DAPA was invalid on statutory grounds, making
resolution of the constitutional issue unnecessary.
26

Duke Memorandum, supra note 5.
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A number of courts enjoined the DACA rescission within months
of its issuance, holding that Secretary Duke’s explanation for the rescission was insufficient.27 One court required DHS to submit a more
detailed explanation.28 In June 2018, new Acting Secretary Kirstjen
Nielsen did so, including both legal and policy arguments. In her
legal discussion, Nielsen affirmed Attorney General Sessions’s conclusion that DACA was unlawful in light of the Fifth Circuit’s DAPA
ruling. Citing the logic and structure of the INA discussed earlier,
Nielsen explained that the Fifth Circuit had held that granting deferred action to a large group of otherwise removable foreign nationals was “contrary to the statutory scheme” of specific forms of legal
status and a residual category of foreign nationals subject to removal.
In her policy discussion, Nielsen again cited the structural account of the INA to pinpoint what she termed “serious doubts”
about DACA’s lawfulness. According to Nielsen, it was reasonable
to rescind a policy in the face of such doubts, rather than maintain
it in the face of legal challenges from states. Nielsen added a related
policy concern that in her view Congress, not the executive, should
authorize programs as extensive as DACA, thereby providing more
certainty and predictability than the executive branch could offer.
Nielsen also articulated a general preference in administrative
trade-craft for case-by-case determinations about deferred action,
not the sweeping criteria that DACA entailed. In addition, Nielsen
contended that a program such as DACA would send confusing signals about the government’s commitment to enforcing Congress’s
scheme, especially given what Nielsen called “unacceptably high
levels” of unlawful immigration.
Finally, Nielsen discounted the expectations of DACA recipients
that they would be able to stay in the United States or at least complete projects here, such as courses of study or medical treatment. She
observed that DACA was always intended to be temporary. Reinforcing her denigration of recipients’ reliance interests, Nielsen stressed
that Obama administration officials, when implementing DACA,
27 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 505–10
(9th Cir. 2018), aff’d, 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020); Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y.
2018); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 237–43 (D.D.C. 2018) (NAACP I); see also
NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457, 467–73 (D.D.C. 2018) (NAACP II) (finding new
explanation by then–Acting DHS Secretary Nielsen inadequate).
28

See NAACP I, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 245.
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had expressly refused to grant recipients any enforceable legal rights
in DACA’s continuation. In any case, Nielsen concluded, in the absence of congressional approval for DACA, the erosion of the INA’s
structure caused by enabling the “continued presence” of a large
group of foreign nationals without a lawful status outweighed any
reliance interests that the program may have instilled.29
While lower courts gave the DACA rescission an unfavorable reception, their rationales were unpersuasive. In an illustrative example, the Ninth Circuit minimized both the structural concerns that
had driven the Fifth Circuit to hold that DAPA was unlawful and
the relevance of those concerns to DACA.30 The Ninth Circuit analogized DACA to earlier uses of deferred action, failing to acknowledge that those earlier occasions encompassed either a bridge to a
legal status or a response to hardship such as extreme youth, age,
or infirmity. DACA failed to fit the “bridge” category; the program
was beneficial to recipients precisely because they had no reasonably
available path to a legal status. Taking the broadest possible view of
the “hardship” category, DACA barely fit. DACA recipients came to
the United States as children, and thus had something in common
with past deferred action recipients who received benefits because
of their youth. DACA recipients are a varied group, however, including some people as old as 29 who can still qualify for the program.
If DACA’s dimensions failed to fit either the “bridge” or “hardship”
categories, the program conflicted with the INA’s framework.
The Ninth Circuit and other courts failed to acknowledge the
scope of this structural problem, let alone resolve it. As of June 2020,
the key question was whether the Supreme Court would find a more
satisfying approach to the difficult issues posed by the Trump administration’s attempt to rescind DACA.

II. Stewardship and Prospective Americans
As an alternative to the structural analysis outlined above and
in Justice Thomas’s Regents dissent, consider an approach based on
stewardship. As I conceive it, stewardship is not a license for the
free-floating exercise of presidential power; instead it resides in the
second category of Justice Robert Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence,
29
30

See Nielsen Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2–3.
See Regents, 908 F.3d at 505–10.
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as a gap-filler in cases of statutory silence.31 From the Founding era,
Congress and the public have expected that presidents will assume
responsibility for the welfare of refugees and other prospective
Americans imperiled by hostile nonfederal sovereigns. In that sense,
deferred action is part of the foreign affairs toolkit. As described by
the Supreme Court in previous decisions, immigration officials’ “deferred action” in lieu of removal can spring from this stewardship
rationale.32 Indeed, President Obama’s rationale for DACA entailed
similar reasoning. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Regents suggests
that once the executive branch has chosen to offer such protection,
officials must deliberate soundly about the reasons for ending it.

A. The Framers, Historical Practice, and Stewardship’s Central Values
The Framers were familiar with stewardship and similar concepts
such as the role of the fiduciary in assuming responsibility for others. In Federalist No. 23, Alexander Hamilton analogized government to a private fiduciary, urging that “government ought to be
clothed with all the powers requisite to complete execution of its
trust.”33 Consistency is a watchword of the stewardship envisioned
by the Framers, while volatility is its antithesis.
For Hamilton, consistency was built into the virtues of the presidency, including decisiveness. The Framers sought a Constitution
with a strong federal government in part to ensure that the nation
spoke with “one voice” in world affairs, instead of shifting between
31 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (asserting that legislative
acquiescence should prompt judicial deference); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1981) (upholding presidential claims settlement as reflecting longstanding practice in which Congress has acquiesced); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb–Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original
Understanding, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 689 (2008) (analyzing Youngstown’s implications);
Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411, 415 (2012); Brett M. Kavanaugh, Congress and the President
in Wartime, Lawfare (blog), Nov. 29, 2017, reviewing David Barron, Waging War: The
Clash Between Presidents and Congress, 1776 to ISIS (2016), https://bit.ly/2XzFMlv.
32 See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 408–09 (2012) (warning that overzealous immigration
enforcement by the several states could undermine federal decisions to extend consideration to undocumented foreign nationals in the United States who were “college
student[s]” or had some other functional tie to the country).
33 See The Federalist No. 23, supra note 1, at 153–54; see also Kent et al., supra note 1, at
2130 (discussing the president’s oath of office and the Constitution’s Take Care Clause,
which both commit the president to faithful execution of the laws of the United States).
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the multiplicity of agendas that might drive individual states within
the new republic.34 Indeed, in Rutgers v. Waddington, a celebrated case
prior to the Constitution’s enactment, Hamilton persuaded a New
York court to look to the law of nations as a guide in a property
dispute in which New York law appeared to conflict with the treaty
between the United States and Britain that concluded the Revolutionary War.35 Judged from a stewardship perspective, consistency
over time yields the same virtues as decisiveness in the executive
branch or a single voice in a nation’s foreign relations.
Equitable balancing is also central to deliberative stewardship. A
fiduciary exercising sound stewardship will rarely if ever consider
just one factor. Instead, the steward will discern how various factors interact. For example, in the law of remedies, courts address the
“balance of hardships” among the parties, as well as the public interest. In some cases, equity will require a “fine adjustment” among
competing interests, which the judge should analyze in crafting
remedies.36
Consider Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis in Nken v. Holder. There,
Roberts outlined the test for a stay pending appeal of a removal
34

Arizona, 567 U.S. at 409.

N.Y. Mayor’s Ct. 1784, reprinted in 1 The Law Practice of Hamilton: Documents and
Commentary 393, 405 (Julius Goebel Jr. ed., 1964) (explaining that, because of logic of
federal system established by Articles of Confederation, each of the several states must
be bound by international law when conflicts arise between any one state’s law and international law, and warning of the “confusion” that would arise “if each separate state
should arrogate to itself a right of changing at pleasure” precepts of the law of nations).
On the importance of the Rutgers decision to U.S. foreign relations law and the evolving
institution of judicial review, see Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire: New York
and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664–1830, 193–99
(2005); David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 932, 963–66 (2010). Along these lines, provisions in the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 stemmed from the Framers’ concerns that individual states were failing
to punish violations of international law, including violations of the principle of diplomatic immunity. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715–18 (2004).
35

36 See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (noting that “the qualities of
mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs”); see also Winter v. NRDC,
555 U.S. 7, 24–26 (2008) (holding that in issuing and affirming injunction against navy
training exercises, lower courts had failed to adequately take into account public interest served by the exercises); but see Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age
of Statutes, 96 Va. L. Rev. 485, 513–20 (2010) (criticizing Winter’s reading of equitable
balancing as not giving sufficient weight to Congress’s plan).
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order—a judicial variant of the reprieve prong of DACA.37 Roberts
wrote that a judge can consider whether removal would result in
irreparable harm and whether the “balance of hardships” and the
public interest favored the applicant for a stay. A court must determine whether a noncitizen’s removal prior to full adjudication of her
appeal would unduly impede her ability to appeal and thus relegate
appellate review to an “‘idle ceremony.’”38 Impeding a court’s chance
to consider a colorable claim for relief on appeal injures the applicant
for a stay, but also adversely affects the public interest in a properly functioning means of appellate review. Conversely, an appellate
court should also determine whether a stay would injure the public
interest served by efficient enforcement of immigration law.
Weighing of the public interest has also figured in executive
branch decisions to provide assistance to prospective Americans.
Before DACA, examples of practice in this vein started with a cautionary counter example during the John Adams administration and
proceeded through President Theodore Roosevelt’s intervention in
the San Francisco school crisis of 1906–1907. In each case, a president
either earned scorn for failing to help or acted decisively to intervene.
In the first example—a cautionary tale of stewardship’s absence—
President John Adams infuriated both Congress and the public by
his delivery to British custody of Thomas Nash, who claimed to be
a U.S. citizen named Jonathan Robbins. Britain then tried and executed Nash on charges of mutiny.39 Americans at the time viewed
mutiny as a valid response to brutal British navy discipline and impressment of foreign seamen, including those from U.S. vessels. In
addition, Jefferson and others argued that mutiny was a political
37 Nken, 556 U.S. 418. A stay pending appeal differs from DACA-style relief since
an applicant for a stay first must receive a removal order from DHS, while a DACA
recipient could participate in the program without ever being in removal proceedings.
Moreover, a stay pending appeal lasts only so long as the court needs to resolve the
appeal, while DACA is renewable indefinitely. But both a stay and DACA enable a
reprieve from removal.
38

Id. at 427 (citing Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 10 (1942)).

See Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law, supra note 7, at 134–36; see also
John T. Parry, International Extradition, the Rule of Non-Inquiry, and the Problem of
Sovereignty, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1973, 1975 n.10 (2010) (describing episode as a “cautionary
tale . . . for decades to come”); Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of
Jonathan Robbins, 100 Yale L.J. 229 (1990) (providing comprehensive analysis of this
episode).
39
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crime that targeted an oppressive system and was therefore not an
appropriate subject for extradition. Indeed, Jefferson was skeptical
about extradition because of the difficulty of distinguishing ordinary from political crimes.40 The intervention on Nash’s behalf that
Adams rejected would have provided a clear, consistent signal of
the president’s dedication to rescuing prospective Americans. Meshing with the public interest, intervention would also have dovetailed
with evolving U.S. conceptions of human rights and more mundane
U.S. interests in a growing merchant fleet.
The response to Adams’s failure to save Nash underlined the importance of stewardship to safeguarding prospective Americans.
Adams was almost impeached. He lost the election of 1800, the Federalists ceased to be a significant political force, and extradition became a dead letter for decades. Adams’s default in Nash’s case was
not the only cause of the first two events, but it was a primary factor in the third development and crystallized sentiment that led to
Adams’s loss and the Federalists’ precipitous decline.
In the second example, President Franklin Pierce lived up to
the stewardship model’s expectations. Pierce intervened to rescue
Hungarian dissident Martin Koszta, who had lived in New York before being kidnaped by Austrian agents while in Turkey.41 Secretary
of State William Marcy articulated a consistent test, announcing that
the United States would use its power to protect individuals anywhere around the world who had established a domicile in the United
States. Marcy linked the United States’s intervention with the public
interest in compliance with the “laws of humanity . . . [that] protect
the weak from being oppressed by the strong, and . . . relieve the
distressed.”42 This rationale suggests that for Marcy and President
Pierce, positioning the United States in the vanguard of that humane effort would also enhance the nation’s global reputation and
40 See Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, to George Washington, President (Nov. 7,
1791), https://bit.ly/33qSXJ8 (advising Washington that it was often “difficult to draw the
line between [ordinary crimes] . . . and acts rendered criminal by tyrannical laws only”).

41 Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law, supra note 7, at 138–41; In re Neagle,
135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890).

42 See Hon. William M. Marcy, Secretary of State, to Baron von Hulsemann, Austrian
Charge D’Affaires, Sept. 26, 1853, in Correspondence Between the Secretary of
State and the Charge D’Affaires of Austria Relative to the Case of Martin Koszta 16
(1853), https://bit.ly/30u3qlc.
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thus further U.S. interests. In In re Neagle, the Court cited the Koszta
episode for the proposition that presidential stewardship includes
not merely the “express terms” of treaties and statutes, but also U.S.
“international relations and all the protection [of federal officials,
U.S. nationals, and intending Americans like Koszta] implied by the
nature of the government under the Constitution.”43

B. Stewardship and Federalism
In an early 20th-century episode, President Theodore Roosevelt
and his secretary of state, Elihu Root, practiced stewardship in their
resolution of the San Francisco segregation dispute of 1906–1907. Acting under California law, San Francisco had sought to establish segregated schools for Japanese children domiciled in the United States
with their families. A treaty between Japan and the United States
gave those children rights to the same education as other foreign national children, including those from Europe. Roosevelt ordered federal troops into position to stop any violence against San Francisco’s
Japanese community and sued to enjoin the city’s policy.44 Elaborating on the rationale for Roosevelt’s handling of the segregation
dispute, Root echoed the concern with consistency and the public
interest that drove Hamilton’s arguments in Rutgers v. Waddington.
Root faulted local passions, which could impede the consistency required for foreign affairs and erode “rules . . . essential to the maintenance of peace . . . between nations.”45
In the last 40 years, stewardship has figured in federal responses
to overly aggressive state immigration enforcement that could derail
U.S. foreign policy. In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court struck down a
Texas law that excluded undocumented children from public school.46
While Justice William Brennan, writing for the Court, analyzed the
43 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890); see also John Harrison, The Story of In re Neagle: Sex, Money,
Politics, Perjury, Homicide, Federalism, and Executive Power, in Presidential Power
Stories 133, 153–54 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009) (discussing role of Koszta episode in Neagle); cf. Henry Monaghan, The Protective Power of the
Presidency, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 70–71 (1993) (arguing against unduly broad reading of
Neagle that might result in presidential overreaching).
44 See Elihu Root, The Real Questions under the Japanese Treaty and the San
Francisco School Board Resolution, 1 Am. J. Int’l L. 273, 276 (1907).
45
46

Id. at 273–74.

457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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case in equal–protection terms, Brennan’s opinion framed undocumented children as recipients of a kind of tacit de facto deferred action in which federal officials expressly conceded that they could
not deport each undocumented child. The likelihood that many
undocumented children would grow up knowing only the United
States as their home highlighted the need for stewardship’s virtues
of consistency and equitable balancing. Justice Brennan remarked
on Congress’s power, which the Court has repeatedly recognized,
to set consistent national policy regarding immigration, contrasting
that with states’ patchwork of immigration measures. Moreover, he
wrote, Texas’s law impinged on the broader public interest in educating children. State laws impeding undocumented children’s access
to public education would “foreclose any realistic possibility that . . .
[undocumented children] will contribute in even the smallest way to
the progress of our Nation.”47
In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court again addressed
the conflict between restrictive state measures and federal stewardship.48 Finding that Congress had preempted some of Arizona’s laws
on immigration enforcement, the Court cited Federalist No. 3, in
which John Jay had warned of border states’ habit of “sudden irritation” and resulting skirmishes with foreign states.49 For Jay, easing
the country back from the brink of war required the more “temperate and cool” perspective of the federal government, which could
cultivate that longer-term outlook because it was physically further
from the fraught border.50
Applying Jay’s insights, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that states
could undermine U.S. foreign policy and the overall public interest
through “harassment” of foreign nationals who were students pursuing higher education, veterans of the armed forces, or witnesses
in criminal cases.51 In a nod to consistency, Justice Kennedy warned
that the Framers crafted the Constitution in part to spare a foreign
country from dealing with “50 separate states,” instead of a single
47

Id. at 230.

567 U.S. 387 (2012); Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law, supra note 7, at
162–65.
48

49
50
51

Arizona, 567 U.S. at 395 (citing The Federalist No. 3 (John Jay)).
The Federalist No. 3 (John Jay).
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 408.
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central government that could efficiently address foreign concerns.
For Kennedy, deferred action allowed the federal government to
practice that consistency and speak with “one voice” in the volatile
realm of foreign relations.52
President Obama’s initiation of DACA fit within this stewardship model. As foreign nationals who arrived in the United States
as children and had often known no other country as home, DACA
recipients were a fit subject for interstitial executive protection.
DACA also shielded these hardship cases from overzealous state enforcement efforts of the kind the Court had curtailed in Plyler and
Arizona. Recipients aided the public interest, since they were able to
contribute their time, effort, and talent to the American project, as
Justice Brennan had envisioned in Plyler. The program’s categorical
approach provided consistency and certainty that a more piecemeal
approach to immigration relief would have lacked.
The Trump administration had a different approach, which
prompted judicial skepticism even before Regents. In a 2019 case encompassing the public interest and undocumented immigrants, the
Court in Department of Commerce v. New York required consistency in
the Trump administration’s rationale for adding a citizenship question to the census.53 Adding a citizenship question would have been
a departure from recent practice: although the government had included a citizenship question in the past as part of its constitutional
duty to conduct a census, officials for 60 years had not included this
query. Pre-Trump officials had resisted reintroducing a citizenship
question, explaining that this move would deter participation since
undocumented individuals and their families would fear that an
accurate response would prompt immigration enforcement action.
Reduced participation would skew the population count and with
it calculations on congressional representation, the composition of
state legislatures, and federal funding.54
Against this backdrop of a high-stakes decision affecting the
public interest that pivoted from decades-long agency practice,
52

Id. at 409.

139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019). For commentary on the census decision, see Jennifer Chacón,
The Inside-Out Constitution: Department of Commerce v. New York, 2019 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 231 (2019); Margulies, Rescinding Inclusion, supra note 7, at 1461–67; Gillian E.
Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 (2019).
53

54

Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2562, 2565.
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the Court held that the Commerce Department’s rationale for seeking to reintroduce a citizenship question was “pretextual.”55 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts agreed that the secretary of
commerce had the power to decide to add a citizenship question. But
he also indicated that, under accepted principles of administrative
law, the government when making such “important decisions” had
to offer “genuine justifications” that will survive judicial and public
scrutiny.56 In the census case, the Court found that Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross had failed in his duty to provide such a sincere
justification. Instead, Ross had “contrived” a pretextual rationale by
persuading reluctant Department of Justice officials to assert that a
citizenship question would provide information necessary for compliance with the Voting Rights Act.57
That “disconnect” in the census case between a high-stakes decision and the “contrived” official reason for the agency’s choice
would, if accepted by the Court, have made judicial review into an
“empty ritual.”58 Here, Chief Justice Roberts’s description echoed his
concern in Nken v. Holder that a stay of removal pending appeal was
necessary to avoid making appellate review an “idle ceremony.”59
Sound stewards do not have the time for either empty rituals or idle
ceremonies. Moreover, they do not impose such futile exercises on
others. Secretary Ross’s “pretextual” rationale thus compromised
the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirement of “[r]easoned
decisionmaking.”60 While Chief Justice Roberts did not find that Acting DHS Secretary Duke’s reasons for ending DACA were similarly
contrived, he did identify flaws in her justification that also violated
the APA’s “reasoned decisionmaking” goal.

III. The Court’s DACA Decision: Stewardship Over Structure
This preliminary discussion of stewardship sets the stage for analysis of Chief Justice Roberts’s discussion in Regents. In his opinion
finding DHS’s rationale for rescission inadequate, Roberts sounded
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 2574.
Id. at 2575.
Id.

Id. at 2575–76.

Nken, 556 U.S. at 427.

Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2576.
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three themes in the key of stewardship. First, Roberts focused on
the Duke Memorandum, describing the later Nielsen Memorandum
as an impermissible “post hoc rationalization.”61 Second, Roberts
described DACA recipients’ expectations that the program would
continue, and the Duke Memorandum’s failure to acknowledge and
address those expectations. Third, Roberts asserted that the Duke
Memorandum should have considered other options besides outright termination of the entire program; in particular, Duke should
have considered separating out the reprieve and work permit parts
of the program and continuing the reprieve component.
The third point is striking because Chief Justice Roberts disagreed
with lower-court rulings that viewed DACA as one unified exercise
of executive discretion, instead agreeing with the Fifth Circuit’s
framing of the reprieve/benefits distinction in the DAPA case. But,
compared with the Fifth Circuit’s decision, Roberts’s use of this
frame had a very different practical effect. In the DAPA case, the Fifth
Circuit had cited the inclusion of eligibility for benefits as a basis
for invalidating the program. In contrast, Roberts found fault with
DHS’s insufficient consideration of the consequences of rescinding
both parts of DACA and sent the agency back to the drawing board.
I call his process-based mode of analysis “deliberative stewardship,”
to distinguish it from the stronger, substantive brand of stewardship
that President Theodore Roosevelt championed.

A. Stewardship as Consistency: Reading Chenery Broadly to Limit DHS
to One Bite at the Apple
After determining that courts could review the DACA rescission under the Administrative Procedure Act, Chief Justice Roberts
turned to the important task of deciding whether the Supreme Court
could only consider the conclusory justifications for the rescission in
the 2017 Duke Memorandum, or whether it could also consider the
more detailed explanation in Acting Secretary Nielsen’s June 2018
memorandum. In a key move, Roberts read administrative law doctrine as limiting DHS to reliance on Duke’s perfunctory explanation.
The following subsections analyze Chief Justice Roberts’s approach
to this complex issue and then discuss Justice Kavanaugh’s powerful
dissent.
61

140 S. Ct. at 1909.
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1. Chief Justice Roberts and the perils of agency post hoc
rationalizations

Chief Justice Roberts stressed the need for government to “turn
square corners in dealing with the American people.” A sound steward deliberates systematically, without “cutting corners.”62 In contrast, an agency failing to do its job deliberates in haste and rolls out
shifting rationales to suit its short-term interests.
Administrative law enforces the virtue of consistency through the
Chenery doctrine. That doctrine takes its name from a 1943 Supreme
Court decision holding that a court should only consider an agency’s
initial justification for a decision, not subsequent justifications that
may help the agency in a lawsuit but do not candidly represent the
agency’s original rationale. That holding promotes “clarity in . . . [the]
exercise” of administrative judgment, the responses of the agency’s
stakeholders, and review by courts.63
The Chenery doctrine’s virtues dovetail with the uniformity that
the Framers praised in the federal government’s constitutional role
in foreign affairs. In Arizona v. United States, the virtue of consistency
inhered in the straightforward negotiating position of a single central
government, as compared with the patchwork quilt of 50 different sets
of state law enforcement officials. In the DACA case, the issue was consistency over time; an agency should deliberate about a position clearly
and carefully when it first announces that decision, instead of issuing
“‘post hoc’ [after-the-fact] rationalizations” that confuse the agency’s
audience.64 As Roberts put it, this relentless procession of “belated justifications” forces litigants and courts to “chase a moving target.”65
The confusion that results clashes with the agency’s stewardship role.
Having established the virtue of consistency over time in agency
explanations, Chief Justice Roberts then applied it to limit DHS to
62 Id. (citing St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).

63 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943). Justice Felix Frankfurter, who prized
methodical decisionmaking by agencies, wrote the opinion of the Court in Chenery and
an earlier decision that he cited in his Chenery opinion, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB
313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941). Cf. Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and
Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 Duke L.J. 291, 367 (2003) (explaining
Chenery doctrine).
64 140 S. Ct. at 1909 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 419 (1971)).
65

Id.
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the Duke Memorandum’s reasons for the DACA rescission. Roberts
described the Duke Memorandum as the “natural starting point” for
the Court’s consideration of DHS’s reasons.66 Duke had merely cited,
“without elaboration,” Attorney General Sessions’s legal conclusion
that DACA exceeded the power Congress had delegated to immigration officials under the INA.67 Focusing on the Duke Memorandum’s
stark statement of reasons put DHS at a marked disadvantage in the
case, since Duke had not offered a detailed consideration of DACA recipients’ expectations that the program would continue. In contrast,
the Nielsen Memorandum’s explanation offered a more thorough response. However, Roberts’s devotion to consistency cast the Nielsen
Memorandum’s additional detail as a flaw, not a virtue. Citing the importance of consistency, Roberts determined that this more elaborate
reasoning was “nowhere to be found” in the Duke Memorandum,
and that therefore the Nielsen Memorandum relied on “impermissible post hoc rationalizations” that the Court would not address.68
2. Justice Kavanaugh’s narrower reading of the Chenery doctrine

If the Chenery doctrine is about agency consistency, it is important
that courts apply the doctrine in the same consistent vein. Chief Justice Roberts’s expansive view of Chenery is not the only way to read
administrative law. For Justice Kavanaugh, Roberts’s approach misread the doctrine’s teaching.
In his dissent, Justice Kavanaugh viewed the Nielsen Memorandum’s fuller account of reasons behind the rescission as an entirely
permissible “amplified articulation” of points the government had
made previously.69 For Kavanaugh, Chenery excluded a different subset of after-the-fact explanations: the arguments of lawyers in litigation, who have an incentive to cobble together remotely plausible
rationales to satisfy reviewing courts. The Nielsen Memorandum
was not a lawyer’s tactic. As a mere amplification of earlier reasoning by a responsible official, the Nielsen Memorandum had all the
consistency administrative law could reasonably require.
66
67
68

Id. at 1907.
Id. at 1910.

Id. at 1908–09.

140 S. Ct. at 1934 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Alpharma v. Leavitt, 460 F.3d 1,
6 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
69
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But Justice Kavanaugh’s more constrained view of the Chenery doctrine does not fully answer Chief Justice Roberts’s concerns.70 Consistency in this case would have cost DHS little. DHS could have
deliberated with greater depth in 2017, instead of issuing a more comprehensive explanation only after judicial prompting. Especially given the
high stakes of the decision, it was reasonable for Chief Justice Roberts
to expect a more detailed explanation of DHS’s reasons up front.

B. Regents and Reliance Interests
The equitable balancing dimension of stewardship took center
stage for Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis of DACA recipients’ reliance interests. As noted above, stewardship considers both the “balance of hardships” and the public interest. In finding that the Duke
Memorandum had failed to assess the weight of recipients’ reliance,
Roberts observed that maintaining stability for recipients also benefited the public.
As a matter of administrative law doctrine, Roberts’s analysis of the
Duke Memorandum’s deliberative flaws invoked that staple of robust
judicial review, the “hard look” doctrine.71 Under the “hard look”
doctrine, there must be a “satisfactory explanation” of the agency’s
decision. Moreover, the agency must engage in “consideration of the
relevant factors” and address each “important aspect of the problem”
at hand.72 That commitment to “consideration” is a core tenet of equitable balancing and the duties of stewardship. Because her memorandum did not assess the weight that DHS should accord recipients’
reliance interests, Acting Secretary Duke failed this threshold test.
Roberts noted that the Duke Memorandum would have terminated DACA recipients’ participation starting with current terms
that ended on March 6, 2018, a mere six months after the rescission’s
announcement, with all participation ending two years after that,
on March 6, 2020. While at first blush this wind-down period might
70 In the interest of full disclosure, I should explain that my own view has shifted
on this point. In an earlier piece, I also took a narrow view of Chenery and the DACA
rescission, although my discussion was limited to two sentences in a footnote. See
Margulies, Rescinding Inclusion, supra note 7, at 1473 n.240.
71 140 S. Ct. 1912–13 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).

72 Id. at 1905 (citing Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416); id. at 1913 (citing State Farm, 463
U.S. at 43).

149

23205_06_Margulies.indd 149

9/7/20 11:45 AM

Cato Supreme Court Review
seem reasonable, a closer look revealed that Duke had failed to either accommodate the expectations of recipients or explain why such
accommodation was inappropriate. Consider again the hypothetical
posed earlier of a DACA recipient who enrolled in a four-year college
in September 2016 and whose two-year DACA period of participation
was due to end on March 6, 2018. In Chief Justice Roberts’s apt phrase,
this recipient would be “caught in the middle of a time-bounded commitment,” without either sufficient notice of the rescission to avoid embarking on an undergraduate degree or sufficient time to complete her
college education.73 Chief Justice Roberts described a similar predicament for persons serving in the armed forces or receiving an extended
course of needed medical treatment. According to Roberts, Duke
could have considered allowing our hypothetical college student and
similar “caught in the middle” recipients to complete their respective
periods of study, treatment, or service.74 A good steward would have
at least deliberated about a wind-down that reflected these concerns.
The dashed expectations that Chief Justice Roberts flagged also
affected a large number of U.S. nationals. In our college student hypothetical, consider the interests of the U.S. school that had counted
on the recipient’s continued enrollment and devoted substantial resources to her education. Chief Justice Roberts suggested that those
interests were also an aspect of the case that DHS should have considered.75 Roberts did not cite the Supreme Court’s decision almost
40 years earlier in Plyler v. Doe. Nevertheless, his argument echoed
the anxiety in Plyler and Arizona about negative externalities—
impacts on persons and entities beyond the parties. Echoing these
risks, Roberts reminded readers that the adverse effects of the rescission would “radiate outward” from recipients to U.S. persons
and institutions involved in recipients’ lives, including U.S. citizen
children, schools where recipients “study and teach,” and employers who invested money and effort in preparing recipients to work
in their companies and were now facing a loss of their investment.76
73
74

Id. at 1914.
Id.

Id. (quoting the rescission’s challengers and their amici as asserting that there was
“much for DHS to consider,” including the expectations of third parties with ties to
DACA recipients).
75

76 Id. (citing Brief for Respondent Regents of Univ. of Cal. et al. at 41–42, Dep’t of
Homeland Security v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (No. 18-587)).
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As a sound steward, DHS had to deliberate about the relative merits
of rescission versus the synergy that rescission would extinguish between DACA and the public interest. Beyond deliberation, Robert disclaimed any duty by DHS to continue the program. Upon deliberation,
DHS might have concluded that recipients’ reliance interests were not
weighty in the scheme of things or did not outweigh legal questions
about the program. But the Duke Memorandum suffered from a deliberative deficit. Invoking the responsibilities of stewardship, Roberts
asserted that deliberation about reliance interests was a central part of
“the agency’s job” and “responsibility” that the agency had neglected.77

C. Stewardship’s Puzzle: The Practical Problems with Separation of
Forbearance and Benefits
In the course of discussing DHS’s failure to consider recipients’ reliance interests, Chief Justice Roberts also separated out two aspects
of DACA: its reprieve from deportation, which Roberts called “forbearance,” and its provision of eligibility for a work permit, which
Roberts referred to as DACA’s “benefits” prong.78 Roberts asserted
that Acting Secretary Duke erred by failing to consider the legality
of continuing forbearance under DACA, while terminating benefits.
Roberts’s separation of these two parts of DACA reinforced his point
that DHS failed to consider reliance interests. But Roberts’s separation of DACA into forbearance and benefits was artificial, since in
practice the two parts are often integrally related.
Roberts clearly viewed as “important” Acting Secretary Duke’s
failure to separately consider the legality of benefits and forbearance,
respectively.79 For Roberts, forbearance—detached from benefits—
was DACA’s “centerpiece.”80 According to Roberts, the bulk of the
DHS memorandum announcing DACA was “devoted entirely” to
77
78

Id.

Id. at 1911–13.

Id. at 1913 (citation omitted). Harvard Law professor Benjamin Eidelson was one
of the architects of advocates’ strategy on this point. See Benjamin Eidelson, “Unbundling DACA and Unpacking Regents: What Chief Justice Roberts Got Right,”
Balkinization (blog), June 25, 2020, https://bit.ly/3gwIQpX; see also Josh Blackman,
“Where Did CJ Roberts’s Anti-Saving Construction in the DACA Case Come From?,”
Reason: Volokh Conspiracy, June 20, 2020, https://bit.ly/2Pp4jVQ (discussing origins
and development of separation idea in the course of litigation over the DACA rescission).
79

80

Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1913.
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forbearance, with a single isolated sentence instructing DHS to consider recipient requests for work permits.81 However, this view of
DACA as centering on forbearance and conferring eligibility for benefits as an afterthought failed to recognize benefits’ crucial role.
From the start, the ability to leverage recipients’ skills by providing work permits was integral to DACA’s plan. In announcing DACA,
DHS Secretary Napolitano cited the “productive young people” that
the program would help, further noting that “many” prospective
recipients had “already contributed to our country in significant
ways.”82 These observations were hardly throwaway lines. Building on her description of prospective recipients’ valuable contributions to U.S. society, Napolitano directed DHS to accept applications
for work permits from DACA recipients. Picking up on this signal,
contemporary media accounts and immigration advocates touted
DACA’s benefits.83 A policy of forbearance without benefits would
not have earned that level of enthusiasm.84
That said, separating forbearance from benefits is not entirely artificial. Consider recipients that Roberts mentioned who are enrolled
in college or receiving medical treatment. A state such as California
allows noncitizens to enroll in higher education programs and pay
in-state tuition even if they are not lawfully present.85 Some hospitals
will provide medical treatment under similar circumstances. For at
least the California cohort of recipients, forbearance alone will serve
81
82

Id. at 1912 n.6.

See Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 4, at 2.

See Julia Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., “Obama to Permit Young Migrants to
Remain in U.S.,” N.Y. Times, June 16, 2012, at A1 (citing eligibility for work permits in
lead paragraph, mentioning eligibility throughout story, and quoting “[i]mmigrant
student leaders as expecting that the ‘majority of [immigrant] students would seize
the opportunity to work and come out of the shadows’”).
83

84 On the practical problems with separating benefits and forbearance, the proof is in the
pudding. DHS’s practice under President Obama’s second Senate-confirmed Homeland
Security Secretary, Jeh Johnson, virtually always resulted in work authorization for successful DACA applicants. See Jie Zong et al., Migration Pol’y Inst., A Profile of DACA Recipients by Education, Industry, and Occupation 3–8 (Nov. 2017), https://bit.ly/30yWhjD
(describing details of DACA recipients’ work permit status based on DHS statistics, and
implying that virtually all recipients who sought a work permit received one).
85 Martinez v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 861 (Cal. 2010) (citing Cal.
Educ. Code § 68130.5(a)(4)); see also Ming Hsu Chen, Beyond Legality: The Legitimacy of Executive Action in Immigration Law, 66 Syracuse L. Rev. 87, 129–30 (2016)
(describing state laws and policies).
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reliance interests. To that extent, Roberts’s point that DHS should
have considered splitting up benefits and forbearance fits the model
of deliberative stewardship.86
Viewing DHS’s duty as deliberative stewardship connects Regents
with earlier precedents such as Plyler v. Doe and Arizona v. United States
and historical examples such as President Pierce’s intervention in the
Martin Koszta episode. Regents also echoes the 2019 census decision,
Department of Commerce v. New York. In Department of Commerce, as noted
above, Chief Justice Roberts noted the high stakes of adding a citizenship question on the census and required a clear and consistent justification. The Commerce Department’s “contrived” justification on needing
data for Voting Rights Act compliance failed to pass muster.87 Admittedly, Roberts did not refer to Acting Secretary Duke’s explanation for
the DACA rescission as pretextual, in the way that he had characterized
Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross’s reasons in the census case. Nevertheless, each decision focused on flawed and shifting explanations
for momentous actions that departed from established practice. In both
decisions, Roberts seems to be reminding agencies that stewardship requires sounder deliberation than the agencies saw fit to provide.

D. Justice Thomas’s Dissent
On the substance of the DACA rescission, Justice Thomas’s dissent
stressed the structural concerns raised by the Fifth Circuit about
the DAPA program. In interpreting statutes, courts generally hold
that Congress does its work mindfully, drafting language to cover
issues it considers crucial and specifically describing areas where
it has delegated discretion to an agency such as DHS. When courts
read Congress’s silence as giving vast power to an agency, the courts
risk making the text of the law “wholly superfluous.”88 Treating the
86 Chief Justice Roberts rejected the claim of the rescission’s challengers that the
rescission violated the Equal Protection Clause. 140 S. Ct. at 1915–16. Justice Sonia
Sotomayor dissented from this part of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion. Id. at 1916–18
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part).
87 139
88 Id.

S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019).

at 1925 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also stated that if the statute
permitted a vast program like DACA to be created under executive fiat, the INA
would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Id. at 1929 n.13. Cf. Gary
Lawson, “I’m Leavin’ It (All) Up to You”: Gundy and the (Sort-of) Resurrection of
the Subdelegation Doctrine, 2018–2019 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 31 (2019) (discussing recent
indications that the Supreme Court is ready to revive the nondelegation doctrine).
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actual words of the statute as a useless ornament that the executive
branch can sweep aside would make Congress a supporting player
in the legislative arena, when Congress should have the lead role.
Applying these principles, Justice Thomas asserted that DACA, like
DAPA, was far too large a program to fit within the INA’s specific
framework. Congress’s careful drafting would have been a waste of
time if DHS could establish a program of DACA’s size “at the stroke of
a Cabinet secretary’s pen.”89 By invalidating an effort by a subsequent
administration to end this clash with the INA’s framework, the Court’s
majority had disregarded a crucial tenet of statutory interpretation.
Furthermore, Thomas reminded the majority that regard for the
reliance interests of DACA recipients did not fit past practice on
deferred action, which Justice Scalia in an earlier decision had described as rooted in administrative “convenience.”90 Indeed, when
it announced DACA during the Obama administration, DHS had
stated that it could “terminate . . . deferred action at any time at the
agency’s discretion.”91 Thomas warned that while deferred action’s
ease of implementation had been a virtue, the majority’s decision
would henceforth make future officials hesitate to grant it, since rescinding such grants will in the future entail “years of litigation.”92
While Thomas’s critique of the majority’s position is cogent, ultimately Roberts’s focus on DACA recipients’ reliance interest is
more convincing from a stewardship perspective. Thomas’s dissent
insightfully outlined the structural argument against DACA. But
Roberts’s focus on DHS’s deliberative deficit sidestepped this point.
Stewardship’s equitable balancing strand helps support Roberts’s
analysis. As mentioned above, under longstanding equitable principles that govern how a court devises a remedy for a particular illegal act, the court must consider a range of factors, including the
balance of hardships and the public interest.93 That may mean that a
court will not order an immediate end to a practice, but will instead
89

140 S. Ct. at 1925–26 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

Id. at 1931 n.16 (citing Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.,
525 U.S. 471, 484 (1999)).
90

91

Id. (citation omitted).

Id.; cf. Ilya Shapiro, “DACA Ruling: Bad Judging on Top of Bad Lawyering, Good
for Dreamers but Makes Immigration Reform Harder,” Cato at Liberty (blog), June 18,
2020, https://bit.ly/2XwReho.
92

93

See Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329.
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order a gradual termination. While a court has discretion to craft a
remedy that includes a wind-down or opt for immediate termination
of the challenged practice, the court will have to show that it balanced all the necessary factors in reaching its result.94 This is exactly
what DHS failed to do in rescinding DACA. That failure of due deliberation about remedy was problematic, regardless of DACA’s legal
merits. In this sense, Roberts’s approach fit the stewardship model
and deflected much of Thomas’s critique.

Conclusion
Like the Court’s 2019 census decision, Department of Commerce,
in which Chief Justice Roberts also authored the majority opinion,
Regents imposes a higher than usual burden of justification on executive branch officials. In the census case, the Court found the Department of Commerce’s “voting rights enforcement” rationale for a
census citizenship question to be pretextual. It did so even though
that finding involved looking behind the Commerce Department’s
stated justifications, into its “contrived” interactions with a Justice
Department that—truth to tell—seemed largely uninterested in the
Commerce Department’s ostensible voting rights rationale. Regents
did not find that DHS’s reasons for rescinding DACA were pretextual. But Chief Justice Roberts still looked beyond the structural
issue of DACA’s fit with the INA and found the agency’s deliberative
process flawed, especially in its failure to consider DACA recipients’
reliance interests and alternatives to the outright termination by
March 2020 that DHS had announced.
Although Chief Justice Roberts did not mention stewardship per
se in his opinion, his analysis of DHS’s “job” and “responsibility”
in deliberating about reliance interests and alternatives to outright
rescission sounded in that key. Starting with the cautionary tale of
stewardship’s absence in the Jonathan Robbins episode during the
John Adams administration, executive practice has contemplated a
gap-filling role in protecting prospective Americans against nonfederal sovereigns. The stewardship suggested by this interstitial role
has highlighted the virtues of consistency and equitable balancing,
94 See N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Citizens v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 969–72 (2d Cir.
1983). In this decision, Judge Henry Friendly discussed the role of factors such as the
public interest and effects on persons or entities not before the court in modification of
an equitable decree reforming a government institution.
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especially synergies between the welfare of prospective Americans
and the public interest. Cases like Plyler v. Doe and Arizona v. United
States illustrate these virtues in restraining individual states’ efforts
at immigration enforcement when that enforcement might affect
the national interest and U.S. foreign relations. Department of Commerce touched on similar virtues, particularly in its skeptical look
at the Commerce Department’s stated rationale for departing from
decades of practice omitting a citizenship question from the census.
In Regents, the dissenters made cogent arguments that the majority’s review lacked a clear basis in either administrative law doctrine
or the statutory scheme. Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent pointed out that
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, which limited DHS to reliance on the
stark Duke Memorandum and barred any consideration of the later,
more detailed Nielsen Memorandum, rested on an expansive reading of the Chenery doctrine. Excluding the Nielsen Memorandum
may not serve Chenery’s premises, which center on the need to limit
agency lawyers’ litigation-driven rationales.
Justice Thomas’s dissent argued to great effect that Chief Justice
Roberts failed to fully address the large DACA program’s poor fit with
the INA’s carefully crafted framework of enumerated categories of foreign nationals who can enter or legally remain in the United States and
its residual category of persons subject to removal. That structural concern drove the courts’ halt of the Obama administration’s even larger
DAPA program. The role of similar structural concerns on DACA raises
difficult questions that Roberts did not try to definitively answer.
Nevertheless, the stewardship model supports Chief Justice
Roberts’s focus on the deliberative virtues of consistency, consideration of synergies between DACA recipients’ expectations and the
public interest, and assessment of alternatives. Acting Secretary
Duke would have lost little by a fuller explanation of reasons in
September 2017, when DHS first announced the DACA rescission.
Moreover, analogy to the law of equitable remedies shows that DHS
could have deliberated with greater care about resolving tensions
between DACA and the statutory scheme.
Taking care of the laws of the United States is a key part of the executive branch’s constitutional responsibility. The DACA rescission
affected the implementation of the INA and the interests of millions
of U.S. citizens, LPRs, domiciliaries, and organizations. A duty of
deliberative stewardship in a matter with such high stakes is a reasonable requirement to impose on a responsible agency.
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